Vitruvius Pollio, I dieci libri dell?architettura, 1567

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                <p type="main">
                  <s id="s.000226">
                    <pb pagenum="9" xlink:href="045/01/017.jpg"/>
                    <emph type="italics"/>
                  chieſa. </s>
                  <s id="s.000227">& non uogliono conſiderare, che non hanno, Geometria, nè Arithmetica, nè intende
                    <lb/>
                  no la for za delle proportioni, & la natura delle coſe. </s>
                  <s id="s.000228">Egli biſogna adunque hauere eſſercitio, &
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                  fabrica; biſogna diſcorſo. </s>
                  <s id="s.000229">Il diſcorſo come padre; la Fabrica è come madre dell'Architettu­
                    <lb/>
                  ra.
                    <emph.end type="italics"/>
                  {
                    <emph type="italics"/>
                  La fabrica è continuato penſiero dell'uſo.
                    <emph.end type="italics"/>
                  }
                    <emph type="italics"/>
                  Ogni artificioſo componimento ha lo eſſer
                    <lb/>
                  ſuo dalla notitia del fine come dice Galeno. </s>
                  <s id="s.000230">Volendo adunque fabricare, fa di meſtieri hauerc co
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                  noſcimento del fine. </s>
                  <s id="s.000231">Fine intendo io quello, a cui s'indrizza la operatione: Et in queſto lo intel­
                    <lb/>
                  letto conſidera, che coſa è principio, & che coſa è mezo. </s>
                  <s id="s.000232">& truoua che il principio ſi conſide­
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                  ra in modo di preſidenza, & nel principiare il fine è prima dello agente, perche il fine è quello,
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                  che muoue all'opera: lo agente è prima che la forma, perche lo agente induce la forma; & la
                    <lb/>
                  forma è prima, che la materia: imperoche la materia non è moſſa, ſe la forma non è prima nel­
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                  la mente di colui che opera. </s>
                  <s id="s.000233">Il mezo ueramente è il ſoggetto nel quale il fine manda la ſua ſimi­
                    <lb/>
                  glianza al principio, & il principio la rimanda al fine: però non è concordanza maggiore di
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                  quella, che è tra'l principio, e'l fine. </s>
                  <s id="s.000234">oltra di queſto egli ſi comprende che chiunque impediſce il
                    <lb/>
                  mezo, leua il principio dal fine: & che il mezo per cagione del principio s'affatica, & riſpetto
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                  al fine ſiripoſa. </s>
                  <s id="s.000235">Volendo adunque fabricare, biſogna conoſcere il fine, come quello, ch'al me­
                    <lb/>
                  zo impone forza, & neceſſità. </s>
                  <s id="s.000236">Ma per la cognitione del fine è neceſſario lo ſtudio, & il penſa­
                    <lb/>
                  mento: Et ſi come il ſaettatore non indrizzarebbe la ſaetta alla brocca, ſe egli non teneſſe fer­
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                  ma la mira, coſi l'Artefice non toccarebbe il fine, ſe con la mente altroue egli ſi riuolgeſſe. </s>
                  <s id="s.000237">
                    <lb/>
                  L'uſo adunque è (come s' è detto) drizzare le coſe al debito fine: come abuſo è torcerle da quel­
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                  lo. </s>
                  <s id="s.000238">Ma per hauere queſto indrizzamento delle coſe al fine, fa biſogno d'hauere un'altro uſo, ilqua
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                  le uuol dire Aſſuefattione, laquale non è altro, che ſpeſſa, & frequentata operatione d'alcuna
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                  uirtù, & potenza dell'anima, o del corpo. </s>
                  <s id="s.000239">onde egli ſi dice eſſer uſato alle fatiche, eſſer uſato, po­
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                  ſto in uſo, uſanza, & conſuetudine. </s>
                  <s id="s.000240">Biſogna adunque eſſer uſo di continuamente penſare al fi­
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                  ne. </s>
                  <s id="s.000241">Et però dice Vitr.
                    <emph.end type="italics"/>
                  </s>
                  <s id="s.000242"> Fabrica eſſer continuo, & eſſercitato, & come uia trita, & battu­
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                  ta da paſſaggieri frequentato penſiero d'indrizzare le coſe a fine conueniente. </s>
                </p>
                <p type="main">
                  <s id="s.000243">
                    <emph type="italics"/>
                  Et da queſte parole ſi dimoſtra la utilità che era conditione dell'Arte. </s>
                  <s id="s.000244">Ma perche con tanta
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                  ſollecitudine di penſiero affaticarſi, a che ſenza intermiſſione penſare? </s>
                  <s id="s.000245">certo non per altro, che
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                  per manifeſtare in qualche materia eſteriore la forma, che prima era nel penſiero, & nella men­
                    <lb/>
                  te; & però dice Vitr. dando fine alla diffinitione della Fabrica, quella eſſere operatione manife­
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                  ſta in qualche materia fuori di noi, ſecondo il penſiero, che era in noi. </s>
                  <s id="s.000246">Vero è, che Fabrica è
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                  nome commune a tutte le parti dell'Architettura, & molto piu abbraccia, di quèllo che commu
                    <lb/>
                  nemente ſi ſtima, come ſi dirà poi.
                    <emph.end type="italics"/>
                  </s>
                  <s id="s.000247"> Diſcorſo è quello che le coſe fabricate prontamente,
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                  & con ragione di proportione puo dimoſtrando manifeſtare. </s>
                </p>
                <p type="main">
                  <s id="s.000248">
                    <emph type="italics"/>
                  Il diſcorſo è proprio dell'huomo, & la uirtu, che diſcorre, è quella che conſidera quanto ſi puo
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                  fare con tutte le ragioni all'opere pertinenti; & però erra il diſcorſo, quando lo intelletto non
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                  concorda le proprietà delle coſe atte a fare, con quelle che ſono atte a riceuere. </s>
                  <s id="s.000249">Diſcorre adun­
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                  que l'huomo, cioè applica il principio al fine per uia del mezo: ilche, come s'è detto, è proprio
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                  della humana ſpecie. </s>
                  <s id="s.000250">Auenga che gli antichi habbiano à gli altri animali conceſſo una parte di
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                  ragione, & chiamati gli habbiano maeſtri dell'huomo, dicendo, che l'Arte del teſſere è ſtata
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                  preſa dalla Ragna, la diſpoſitione della caſa, dalla Formica, il gouerno ciuile dalle Api; ma noi
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                  trouamo, che quelli ſono inſtinti di natura, & non diſcorſi dell'Arte: & ſe Arte ſi deue chia­
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                  mare la loro naturale, & non auueduta prudenza, perche non ſi potrebbe ſimilmente Arte chia­
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                  mare la uirtù che nelle piante, & nelle pietre ſi truoua? </s>
                  <s id="s.000251">Come l'Arte dello Elleboro purgar il fu­
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                  rore, l'Arte della pietra ne i nidi dell'Aquile, detta Aetite, rilaſciare i parti? </s>
                  <s id="s.000252">Perche anche
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                  non ſi potrebbe dire eſſere un'Arte diuina che regge, & conſerua il mondo? </s>
                  <s id="s.000253">una Celeſte che re­
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                  gola i mouimenti de i cieli? </s>
                  <s id="s.000254">una Mondana, che tramuta gli elementi? </s>
                  <s id="s.000255">Ma laſciamo la tralatione
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                  de i nomi, fatta per la ſimiglianza, & pigliamo la uerità, & la proprietà delle coſe. </s>
                  <s id="s.000256">Diſcorſo
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                  adunque è come padre, ſecondo che detto hauemo di ſopra, dell'Architettura: nel quale ui biſo-
                    <emph.end type="italics"/>
                  </s>
                </p>
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            </subchap1>
          </chap>
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    </archimedes>